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Due Process by Proxy: United States v. Brehm and the
Problem of ExtraterritorialJurisdiction over Foreign Nationals*
INTRODUCTION

In carrying out its overseas military operations, the United States
government relies on the support of an increasing number of private
contractors from around the globe.' Nearly 2.5 million private
contractors are currently employed in conflict zones, outnumbering
troops in some areas.2 The contract workers assist with everything
from security to translation services to "technical support."' While
their work is essential, their presence inevitably gives rise to some
new challenges.
One such challenge recently came before the Fourth Circuit in
United States v. Brehm.4 The case stemmed from a violent altercation
between two private contractors at a NATO base in Kandahar,
Afghanistan.' The victim, a British national identified only as "J.O.,"
underwent emergency surgery for stab wounds and was then
transported three hundred miles to Bagram, Afghanistan, for
additional surgery.' The perpetrator, a South-African national by the
name of Sean Brehm, was arrested, detained, and eventually
transported seven thousand miles to Alexandria, Virginia, where he
was indicted in federal court.'
Brehm would eventually plead guilty and serve prison time in the
United States, a country he had never visited and to which he had few

* @ 2013 Edward F. Roche.
1. see MOSHE SCHWARTZ, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40835, THE DEPARTMENT
OF DEFENSE'S USE OF PRIVATE SECURITY CONTRACTORS IN IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN:
BACKGROUND,
ANALYSIS,
AND
OPTIONS FOR
CONGRESS
6-7
(2011),
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R40835.pdf (showing that only five percent of U.S.
government contractors in Iraq were American citizens, and only eight percent were
citizens of Iraq).
2. See LAURA A. DICKINSON, OUTSOURCING WAR AND PEACE 3 (2011).
3. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, PUB. No. 3053, CONTRACTORS' SUPPORT OF U.S.
OPERATIONS IN IRAQ 5 (2008),
http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles
/ftpdocs/96xx/doc9688/08-12-iraqcontractors.pdf.
4. 691 F.3d 547 (4th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 808 (2012).
5. See United States v. Brehm, No. 1:11-CR-11, 2011 WL 1226088, at *3 (E.D. Va.
Mar. 30,2011), affd, 691 F.3d 547, cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 808.
6. See id.
7. See id at * 2-3.
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ties.' His victim was a foreign national, and his crime harmed no
American citizens or property.' Therein lay the question for the
Fourth Circuit: under these circumstances, was the district court's
exercise of jurisdiction consistent with the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment?"o

The Fourth Circuit concluded that jurisdiction was proper and
Brehm's conviction should therefore be affirmed," but just as
important as the court's conclusion was its reasoning. Eight other
circuits had already weighed in on the issue and had split in two
directions on the criteria for determining whether jurisdiction
comports with due process. 12 There are no signs that the military's
reliance on an ever-growing contingent of private contractors will
change any time in the near future." As a result, there will be an
ongoing need to police the conduct of this unique population. Federal
courts are therefore likely to be required on an increasingly regular
basis to decide due-process-based jurisdictional questions like the one
raised in Brehm.
In deciding Brehm, the Fourth Circuit unsuccessfully attempted
to steer a middle course between the two conflicting lines of authority
that had divided the other circuits-one holding jurisdiction to be
consistent with due process when the defendant has a sufficient
"nexus" with the United States, and the other holding the
jurisdictional requirements of due process to be satisfied when
jurisdiction exists under international law.14 Rather than engaging
with the strengths and weaknesses of the different approaches, the
Fourth Circuit used an opaque, "proxy-based" method of analysis and
left several significant gaps in its reasoning."
This Recent Development argues that the Fourth Circuit's
treatment of the due process issue in Brehm is unsatisfactory.
8. See Brehm, 691 F.3d at 549-50.
9. See id. at 550-51.
10. See id. at 549.
11. See id.
12. See infra Part I.C (discussing the two different approaches used by the circuits).
13. See DICKINSON, supra note 2, at 37 (citing an interview with a Department of
Defense official on Nov. 7, 2007); see also U.S. DEP'T OF DEF., QUADRENNIAL DEFENSE
REVIEW REPORT 81 (2006), http://www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/QDR20060203.pdf ("The
Department's policy now directs that performance of commercial activities by contractors
... shall be included in operational plans and orders."); Press Release, U.S. Army
Sustainment Command Pub. Affairs, ASC Selects LOGCAP IV Contractors (June 28,
2007), available at http://www.army.mil/-news/2007/06/28/3836-asc-selects-logcap-ivcontractors/ (announcing a ten-year, $150 billion logistics support contract).
14. See infra notes 34-58 and accompanying text.
15. See infra Part II.B.

2013]

EXTRA TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION

1465

Although the outcome makes sense on narrow grounds, the court
failed to properly analyze the issues underlying the impact of the Due
Process Clause on the question of jurisdiction. Therefore, the Brehm
opinion will be unhelpful to military authorities, prosecutors,
defendants, and lower courts as they confront similar issues in future
cases.
This Recent Development further argues that the jurisdictional
due process issue depends, at its core, on the defendant's actual or
constructive notice of the application of American law to his criminal
conduct. By focusing on notice, the Brehm court could have made a
far more compelling argument for due process, while also tapping
into a theme that could potentially repair the circuit split.
Analysis proceeds in four parts. Part I provides the statutory and
constitutional background on the issue of extraterritorial jurisdiction
over non-citizen military contractors and others, and describes the
circuit split that currently exists. Part II discusses in detail the decision
of the Fourth Circuit in Brehm. Part III analyzes that decision and
shows why it was unsatisfactory. Part IV explains how notice-based
reasoning would have been a preferable approach in Brehm, and
would work well in many of the other extraterritorial jurisdiction
cases.
I. STATUTORY AND DUE PROCESS LIMITS ON EXTRATERRITORIAL
JURISDICTION OVER FOREIGN NATIONALS

A.

Background
Congress may enact laws that have effects beyond the territorial
borders of the United States."6 If Congress "clearly expresse[s]" its
intent for a statute to apply extraterritorially, courts will abide by that
intent." In exercise of this legislative jurisdiction," Congress enacted
the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act of 2000 ("MEJA") 9
16.
17.
(1957))
18.

EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991) (citations omitted).
See id. (quoting Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo, S.A., 353 U.S. 138, 147
(internal quotation marks omitted).
"Legislative jurisdiction" is "the authority ... to make laws." BOLESLAw A.
BOCZEK, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A DICTIONARY 77 (2005). Legislative jurisdiction is also
known as "prescriptive jurisdiction." Id. The Court in Arabian American Oil Co. was
discussing the legislative jurisdiction of Congress. See 499 U.S. at 253. This must be
distinguished from the question of adjudicative jurisdiction, which is the subject of this
Recent Development, and which is defined below. See infra note 24 and accompanying
text.
19. Pub. L. No. 106-523, § 2(a), 114 Stat. 2488, 2488 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C
§§ 3261-3267 (2006)).
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with the clearly expressed intent to ensure that the reach of American
criminal law would extend to cover contractors and other civilians
accompanying the military overseas. MEJA provides, in pertinent
part:
Whoever engages in conduct outside the United States that
would constitute an offense punishable by imprisonment for
more than 1 year if the conduct had been engaged in within the
special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States
. *. while employed by or accompanying the Armed Forces
outside the United States . . . shall be punished as provided for

that offense.'
MEJA defines persons "employed by the Armed Forces outside the
United States" as including employees of Department of Defense
contractors and subcontractors. 2 1 The statute applies to American
citizens and non-citizens alike.22
However, even when Congress has taken advantage of its
legislative jurisdiction by enacting a statute that applies
extraterritorially, the question of adjudicative jurisdiction still
applies.23 That issue involves a country's "authority to subject persons
or things to the process of its courts."24 MEJA gives district courts a
statutory basis for adjudicative jurisdiction over defendants accused
of crimes covered by the statute.25 However, a court must still
determine whether the exercise of that jurisdiction in a particular case
is constitutional under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment. 6
B. Due Process As an Independent Constrainton Courts
Before Congress enacted MEJA, a lively debate existed over
whether or not courts should even consider the Due Process Clause in
20. 18 U.S.C. § 3261(a)(1).

21. Id. § 3267(1)(A).
22. Id. The statute contains only one limitation that relates to nationality: it applies
only to a contractor who is "not a national of or ordinarily resident in the host nation." Id.

§ 3267(1)(C).
23. See BOCZEK, supra note 18, at 77.
24. Id.
25. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3262(b) (providing that a defendant "shall be delivered as
soon as practicable to the custody of civilian law enforcement authorities of the United
States for removal to the United States for judicial proceedings"); id. § 3265(a)(1)(A)
(providing for a federal magistrate judge to hold an initial appearance).
26. See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 905 F.2d 245, 248 (9th Cir. 1990) (requiring both
that the statute clearly apply extraterritorially, and "that [the] application of the statute to
the acts in question not violate the due process clause of the fifth amendment" (citations
omitted)).
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determining whether they had jurisdiction. On one side, scholars
argued that the clause was clearly relevant. Once a court finds that a
statute confers extraterritorial jurisdiction, those scholars claimed, it
should then answer the separate question of whether jurisdiction was
consistent with due process.28 Others argued that the Fifth
Amendment should impose no independent constraint on courts as
they determine whether they may exercise extraterritorial
jurisdiction.2 9 According to the proponents of the latter position, a
court's inquiry should be limited to whether jurisdiction is conferred
by statute, and whether its jurisdiction is consistent with international
law." Although the Supreme Court has yet to decide the issue, it has
suggested in dicta that the Due Process Clause does impose an
independent constraint on courts." Moreover, all of the circuits to
address the issue have found themselves-or at least reasoned as if
they are-obligated to consider whether jurisdiction comports with
due process." These considerations lead to the conclusion that "the
present jurisprudential landscape undeniably reveals potential Fifth
Amendment due process barriers to the extraterritorial application of
U.S. law." 33 Therefore, this Recent Development assumes that the
Due Process Clause does impose an independent constraint on courts'
exercise of jurisdiction beyond the constraints of statutory authority
and international law. Even with that larger question set aside,
however, the circuits differ on the following more narrow inquiry:
27. See, e.g., Lea Brilmayer & Charles Norchi, Federal Extraterritorialityand Fifth
Amendment Due Process, 105 HARv. L. REV. 1217, 1223 (1992) (reasoning by analogy to
the doctrine of state extraterritoriality under the Fourteenth Amendment).
28. See id.
29. See A. Mark Weisburd, Due Process Limits on Federal Extraterritorial
Legislation?,35 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 379,383 (1997).
30. See id. at 383 ("[T]o argue that the Due Process clause of the Fifth Amendment
could impose general limitations upon U.S. extraterritorial jurisdiction stricter than those
required by customary international law is to argue that the Fifth Amendment denies to
the United States a degree of authority recognized and asserted by most of the other
nations of the world.").
31. See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 278 (1990) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) ("The United States is prosecuting a foreign national in a court established
under Article III, and all of the trial proceedings are governed by the Constitution. All
would agree, for instance, that the dictates of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment protect the defendant.").
32. See United States v. Angulo-Hernfindez, 565 F.3d 2, 10-11 (1st Cir. 2009); United
States v. Perez-Oviedo, 281 F.3d 400, 402-03 (3d Cir. 2002); United States v. BustosUseche, 273 F.3d 622, 627 (5th Cir. 2001); United States v. Martinez-Hidalgo, 993 F.2d
1052, 1056 (3d Cir. 1993).
33. Anthony J. Colangelo, Constitutional Limits on Extraterritorial Jurisdiction:
Terrorismand the Intersection of National and InternationalLaw, 48 HARV. INT'L L.J. 121,
162(2007).
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how should a court determine whether the Due Process Clause is
satisfied?
The CircuitSplit on the Due ProcessIssue
Courts agree that, in order to satisfy due process, the exercise of
extraterritorial jurisdiction over a foreign national defendant must
not be arbitrary or fundamentally unfair.3 4 However, no consensus
exists regarding the standard for determining whether jurisdiction is
arbitrary or unfair in a particular situation. The circuits divide into
two broad camps.
The first camp, which includes the First," Third,36 and Eleventh
takes what this Recent Development calls the
Circuits,
"international law approach." 8 Courts taking the international law
approach hold that jurisdiction is consistent with due process if
jurisdiction is proper under international law." These courts look to
C.

34. See, e.g., United States v. Ali, 885 F. Supp. 2d 55, 59 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (citation
omitted); United States v. Ibarguen-Mosquera, 634 F.3d 1370, 1378 (11th Cir. 2011);
United States v. Cardales, 168 F.3d 548, 553 (1st Cir. 1999); Martinez-Hidalgo,993 F.2d at
1056; United States v. Davis, 905 F.2d 245, 248-49 (9th Cir. 1990).
35. See Angulo-Herndndez, 565 F.3d at 11 (basing jurisdiction over defendants
arrested in a flagged vessel on the consent of the flag nation). This argument is clearly
premised on international law. "The legitimacy of a flag nation's consent is a question of
international law that can be raised only by the foreign nation." Bustos-Useche, 273 F.3d at
627 (citing United States v. Greer, 223 F.3d 41, 55-56 (2d Cir. 2000) (explaining that a
domestic statute's requirement that the flag nation consent to jurisdiction existed "for
purposes of international comity and diplomatic courtesy, not as a protection for
defendants")).
36. Perez-Oviedo, 281 F.3d at 402-03; Martinez-Hidalgo,993 F.2d at 1056.
37. See United States v. Rendon, 354 F.3d 1320, 1325 (11th Cir. 2003).
38. Although the Seventh Circuit has not officially decided the issue, it seems inclined
to fall into this first group. See In re Hijazi, 589 F.3d 401, 407 (7th Cir. 2009) (declining to
rule on the case for lack of an extradition treaty). "International law approach" is a label I
have assigned to the approach. There is no common name for this method of analysis,
although one author calls it the "notice test." See Brian A. Lichter, Comment, The
Offences Clause, Due Process, and the ExtraterritorialReach of Federal Criminal Law in
Narco-TerrorismProsecutions,103 Nw. U. L. REV. 1929, 1942 (2009). While I argue below
that the most coherent and rational analysis of approach focuses on notice, see infra Part
IV.C, my view of the cases differs slightly from Lichter's since the defendant does not
always have notice when jurisdiction is exercised pursuant to international law. Lichter
himself provides one example of this, based on the passive personality principle. See
Lichter, supra, at 1945 n.112 (querying whether due process would be satisfied when the
defendant lacks notice that the victim is a U.S. citizen). Another example is when
jurisdiction under international law is based on a treaty. While I will later argue for a
"notice test," see infra Part IV.C, I am less generous than Lichter in my current description
of the courts' analysis as the "international law approach."
39. See, e.g., Perez-Oviedo, 281 F.3d at 403 ("[C]onsent from the flag nation
eliminates a concern that the application of the MDLEA may be arbitrary or
fundamentally unfair."); United States v. Caicedo, 47 F.3d 370, 373 (9th Cir. 1995) (finding
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the recognized sources of international law and, if one (or more) of
those sources provides a basis for jurisdiction, these courts find the
Due Process Clause satisfied.'
For example, in United States v. Perez-Oviedo, the defendant was
the captain of a Panamanian ship that was destined for Canada and
carrying two tons of cocaine.41 U.S. Coast Guard agents intercepted
the ship in the Caribbean, far from American territorial waters, and
requested permission from Panama to board and search the ship.42
Panama consented to both the search and the application of U.S. law
to the defendant after the agents found the cocaine on board." PerezOviedo pled guilty in federal district court to a charge of conspiracy
to distribute cocaine." On appeal, the First Circuit found that the
district court's exercise of jurisdiction over the defendant was
consistent with the Due Process Clause because Panama, the "flag
nation" of the ship, had consented to the application of American
law.45 The exercise of jurisdiction on the basis of the consent of the
flag nation is an international law concept.46 Thus, the court deemed
the existence of a basis of jurisdiction under international law
sufficient to satisfy the Due Process Clause, even though neither the
defendant nor his crime had any connection with the United States.47
The second group of courts, which includes the Second and
Ninth Circuits, takes what this Recent Development calls the "nexus

that due process was satisfied when jurisdiction was exercised over a stateless vessel in
compliance with international law).
40. See, e.g., United States v. Ibarguen-Mosquera, 634 F.3d 1370, 1378-79 (11th Cir.
2011) (explaining that courts look to jurisdictional principles under international law such
as the objective territoriality principle, the protective principle, and the principle allowing
jurisdiction over stateless vessels). For more information on the sources of international
law, from which jurisdictional principles and all other principles are drawn, see WILLIAM
R. SLOMANSON, FUNDAMENTAL PERSPECTIVES ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 13-18 (3d ed.
2000).
41. Perez-Oviedo, 281 F.3d at 401.
42. See id.
43. See id. at 401, 403.
44. Id. at 401.
45. See id at 403. A previous case in the First Circuit had very similar facts to PerezOviedo, and the court adopted almost identical reasoning. See United States v. Cardales,
168 F.3d 548, 551-53 (1st Cir. 1999).
46. See Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 585 (1953) (explaining that a vessel flying
the flag of a nation is under the jurisdiction of that nation); United Nations Convention on
the Law of the Sea art. 92, opened for signature Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397 (entered
into force Nov. 16, 1994) ("Ships shall sail under the flag of one State only and, save in
exceptional cases expressly provided for in international treaties or in this Convention,
shall be subject to its exclusive jurisdiction on the high seas.").
47. See Perez-Oviedo, 281 F.3d at 403.

1470

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 91

approach." 48 In order for due process to be satisfied using this
method, a sufficient "nexus" must exist between the defendant and
the United States such that the exercise of jurisdiction over the
defendant is not "arbitrary or fundamentally unfair."49 The Second
Circuit took this approach in United States v. Yousef. 0 The defendant
in that case appealed multiple convictions from the district court, all
of which stemmed from his part in a conspiracy to place bombs on
board twelve American commercial airplanes operating flights in
Southeast Asia." As a test run for these bombings, the defendant had
placed a bomb on a Philippine Airlines flight traveling to Japan.52 The
defendant disembarked during a layover, and the bomb later
exploded, killing a Japanese citizen. 3 The defendant argued that the
district court's exercise of jurisdiction over him violated the Due
Process Clause,5 4 since the only act in furtherance of the conspiracy
had taken place outside the United States and had not harmed any
American citizens or property.5 The Second Circuit, explicitly
borrowing the nexus test from the Ninth Circuit," held that the
district court's jurisdiction over Yousef was consistent with due
process.5 ' The court noted that the defendant's attack on the
Philippine Airlines flight was a "test-run in furtherance of [the]
conspiracy" to attack American airplanes, and held that the nexus
48. See United States v. Al Kassar, 660 F.3d 108, 118 (2d Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S.
Ct. 2374 (2012); United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 111 (2d Cir. 2003); United States v.
Davis, 905 F.2d 245,248-49 (9th Cir. 1990).
49. See Al Kassar, 660 F.3d at 118 (quoting Yousef, 327 F.3d at 111) (internal
quotation marks omitted); Davis, 905 F.2d at 248-49.
50. 327 F.3d at 111-12.
51. See id. at 79-80.
52. See id. at 79.
53. Id.
54. See id. at 111.
55. See id. at 79, 111.
56. Id. at 111 ("The Ninth Circuit has held that '[i]n order to apply extraterritorially a
federal criminal statute to a defendant consistently with due process, there must be a
sufficient nexus between the defendant and the United States, so that such application
would not be arbitrary or fundamentally unfair.' . . . We agree." (quoting United States v.
Davis, 905 F.2d 245, 248-49 (9th Cir. 1990))). In Davis, the Coast Guard encountered the
defendant's vessel thirty-five miles off the California coast, sailing toward San Francisco.
Davis, 905 F.2d at 247. Officers boarded the ship, found marijuana, and arrested the
defendant. See id. Following the defendant's conviction in federal district court, the Ninth
Circuit found that the district court's exercise of jurisdiction was consistent with due
process because a sufficient nexus existed between the defendant and the United States.
See id. at 249. Such a nexus existed because the defendant's "attempted transaction [was]
aimed at causing criminal acts within the United States, [and so] there [was] a sufficient
basis for the United States to exercise its jurisdiction." Id. (quoting United States v.
Peterson, 812 F.2d 486, 493 (9th Cir. 1987)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
57. See Yousef, 327 F.3d at 111-12.
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requirement was satisfied by "the substantial intended effect of their
attack on the United States and its citizens.""
The remaining circuits have yet to commit to either the
international law approach or the nexus approach. 9 Until recently,
this uncommitted group included the Fourth Circuit.
II. UNITED STATES V. BREHM

A.

Factualand Legal Background
Sean Brehm, a South-African national, was a contractor on a
NATO military base in Kandahar, Afghanistan.60 Brehm worked for
DynCorp, an American company providing logistics and support to
the U.S. Army in Afghanistan under a contract with the Department
of Defense.6 ' Brehm was a travel coordinator, stationed at all times
on the base in Afghanistan.6 2 His contract required him to "comply
with applicable laws and regulations of the United States." By
signing the contract, Brehm also confirmed that he "has been
informed of, understands and accepts that [he] may be subject to
U.S.... federal civilian criminal jurisdiction under the Military
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act by accompanying the U.S. Armed
Forces outside the United States."' The Department of Defense
issued Brehm an official Letter of Authorization, permitting him to

58. Id. at 112 (internal quotation marks omitted).
59. The Sixth, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits have not yet considered the issue. The Fifth
Circuit and the District of Columbia Circuit have so far refused to commit to either
approach. See United States v. Delgado-Garcia, 374 F.3d 1337 (D.C. Cir. 2004); United
States v. Suerte, 291 F.3d 366 (5th Cir. 2002). At least one author has placed the Fifth
Circuit among the courts that favor the international law approach. See Lichter, supra note
38, at 1941 (citing Suerte, 291 F.3d at 375). The Fifth Circuit in Suerre did apply the
international law approach, see Suerte, 291 F.3d at 375-76, but the court carefully
restricted its decision to "the issue at hand," which involved an application of the
Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act, a statute invoking some particularized
constitutional issues relating to the Piracies and Felonies Clause. See id. at 372-75; see also
Colangelo, supra note 33, at 173-74 (explaining the significance of the Piracies and
Felonies Clause in the Suerte decision). Even in that limited context, the court did not find
that the international law approach was correct, but instead "[a]ssum[ed], arguendo, that
resolution of this issue does require consulting international law." Suerte, 291 F.3d at 375.
60. See United States v. Brehm, No. 1:11-CR-11, 2011 WL 1226088, at *2 (E.D. Va.
Mar. 30, 2011), aff'd, 691 F.3d 547 (4th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 808 (2012). Of the
NATO military personnel stationed at the base, around eighty percent were from U.S.
military units. See id.
61. See id.
62. See id.
63. Id. (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).
64. Id. (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).

1472

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 91

work at the NATO base in support of the U.S. military." The letter
also informed him that he would receive various benefits and services
from the American government, including transportation, food, and
medical care.66
On the afternoon of November 25, 2010, Brehm was working at
the airport on the military base.' He came across the victim, a British
citizen identified only as "J.O.," with whom he had a pre-existing
personal dispute." Upon seeing each other, Brehm and J.O. began a
verbal altercation, which turned violent when Brehm stabbed J.O.
with some kind of weapon. 69 An agent from the U.S. Army, who
witnessed the attack, approached the men with his firearm drawn and
ordered Brehm to drop his weapon. 0 Brehm eventually complied
after the order was repeated several times." J.O. received treatment
at the scene and was rushed to the American military hospital at the
NATO base for emergency surgery, before being flown to a U.S.
military base in Bagram.n2 The U.S. military police arrested Brehm
and detained him on the base for over two weeks.7 3
Afghanistan had no intention of taking any action against
Brehm. In 2003, Afghanistan entered into an agreement with the
United States, disavowing any interest in prosecuting military or
civilian personnel working for the Department of Defense.74
Consequently, on December 10, 2010, a U.S. magistrate judge issued
an arrest warrant for Brehm and conducted a preliminary hearing by
telephone." Following the judge's orders, Brehm was transported on

65, See id.
66. See id The medical benefit was described as "resuscitative care." Id.
67. Id. at *3.
68. See id. J.O. was working in Afghanistan for a contractor to the United States
Agency for International Development. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. See id.
74. See Agreement Regarding the Status of United States Military and Civilian
Personnel of the U.S. Department of Defense Present in Afghanistan in Connection with
Cooperative Efforts in Response to Terrorism, Humanitarian and Civic Assistance,
Military Training and Exercises, and Other Activities, U.S.-Afg., Sept. 26, 2002-May 28,
2003, Hein's No. KAV 6192, at iv [hereinafter Personnel Agreement] ("The Government
of Afghanistan recognizes the particular importance of disciplinary control by United
States military authorities over United States personnel and, therefore, Afghanistan
authorizes the United States Government to exercise criminal jurisdiction over United
States personnel.").
75. See Brehm, 2011 WL 1226088, at *3.
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December 21, 2010, to the Eastern District of Virginia. On January
5, 2011, a grand jury indicted Brehm on two counts: assault with a
dangerous weapon, and assault resulting in serious bodily injury.
The indictments cited MEJA as the statutory basis for jurisdiction.,7
At his arraignment, Brehm pled not guilty to both counts.
Brehm then moved to dismiss the indictment on two grounds.
First, he argued that MEJA, as applied to him, exceeded the
enumerated powers of Congress.' Second, he claimed that the district
court's exercise of jurisdiction over him was inconsistent with the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment because his "connection to
the United States is so lacking" that the district court could not,
"consistent with the requirements of the Due Process Clause [of the
Fifth Amendment], exercise jurisdiction under MEJA."1 The court
denied the motion." Thereafter, Brehm pled guilty to one of the two
counts of assault." As part of the plea agreement, he retained the
right to appeal the denial of his motion to dismiss.'
B.

The Fourth Circuit'sDecision
On August 10, 2012, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district
court's decision, upholding Brehm's conviction. The Fourth Circuit
made two holdings, one of which was that the Due Process Clause did
76. Id. There is no recorded explanation as to why authorities took Brehm to the
Eastern District of Virginia. DynCorp is headquartered in Falls Church, Virginia, Contact
Us, DYNCORP INT'L, http://www.dyn-intl.comlabout-us/contact.aspx (last visited Feb. 11,
2013), which falls within the Eastern District. Eastern Districtof VirginiaJurisdiction,U.S.
DIST. COURT E. DIsT. VA., http://www.vaed.uscourts.gov/jury/jurisdiction.html (last
visited Oct. 10, 2012). However, whether the company's location was a factor in the
decision remains unclear. The government could have chosen to try Brehm in any district
in the United States, since MEJA's venue provision provides that "[t]he trial of all
offenses begun or committed ... out of the jurisdiction of any particular State or district,
shall be in the district in which the offender . .. is arrested or is first brought." Military
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3238 (2006).
77. Brehm, 2011 WL 1226088, at *1, *3. The offenses were defined by 18 U.S.C.
§§ 113(a)(3), (6), and are federal crimes when committed "within the special maritime and
territorial jurisdiction of the United States." Id. § 113(a).
78. United States v. Brehm, 691 F.3d 547, 550 (4th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct.
808 (2012).
79. Brehm, 2011 WL 1226088, at *3.
80. Id. at *6. Specifically, Brehm argued that Congress lacked the authority "to police
routine assaults between foreigners that occur abroad and do not harm the United States."
Brehm, 691 F.3d at 550.
81. Brehm, 691 F.3d at 550.
82. See Brehm, 2011 WL 1226088, at *7,
83. See Brehm, 691 F.3d at 550.
84. See id.
85. Id. at 554.

1474

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 91

not prevent the district court from exercising adjudicative jurisdiction
over Brehm. 6 This Recent Development focuses only on that
holding. 7
The Fourth Circuit failed to provide a clear statement of the test
it used to determine whether jurisdiction was consistent with the Due
Process Clause. However, the court indicated that due process would
be satisfied if the exercise of jurisdiction "would not be arbitrary or
fundamentally unfair."" The remainder of the court's opinion, in
which it found the due process standard to be satisfied, blended three
steps. At the first step, the court cited the aforementioned decisions
from the Second and Ninth Circuits that have required a "nexus"
between the defendant and the United States to satisfy due process.89
86. Id. at 552-54. The court's holding also had another component beyond the scope
of this Recent Development: the court held MEJA constitutional as applied because
Congress had the authority to apply its criminal laws to foreign nationals extraterritorially.
The court reasoned that Congress had legislative authority under Article I, Section 8 of
the Constitution, especially under its power "to raise and support Armies," id. at 551
(citing U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 12), along with the Necessary and Proper Clause, id.
(citing U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 18). The court's holding on this issue, being very recent,
has yet to receive thorough analysis from commentators. A few authors, however, have
already cast some doubt on this aspect of the decision. See, e.g., Steve Vladeck, Brehm:
Fourth Circuit Creates Split in Contractor-ContactsAnalysis, LAWFARE (Aug. 12, 2012,
7:00
PM),
http://www.lawfareblog.com/2012/08/brehm-fourth-circuit-creates-split-incontractor-contacts-analysis/ ("I don't think it is immediately obvious that Congress's
power over civilian contractors can fairly be traced to the Make Rules Clause of Article I,
which only extends to 'Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval
Forces.' ").

87. Professor Colangelo succinctly describes the difference between the issues that the
two separate holdings address: "Unlike structural limits, due process interests do not
restrict Congress's general authority to make and project law extraterritorially, but act
instead to shield the individual accused from the application of an otherwise constitutional
enactment." Colangelo, supra note 33, at 136 (citing Weisburd, supra note 29, at 384-85).
88. See Brehm, 691 F.3d at 552 (citations omitted). The reader must extrapolate the
content of this test from the court's cryptic language. Rather than explicitly stating the
standard that it planned to apply, the court merely began its analysis by saying that some
courts have, as a proxy for due process, required "a sufficient nexus between the
defendant and the United States, so that such application would not be arbitrary or
fundamentally unfair." Id. (citing United States v. Davis, 905 F.2d 245, 248-49 (9th Cir.
1990)). The court then proceeded to explain that no "nexus" existed in the present case,
see id., but appeared to stand by the requirement that the exercise of jurisdiction must not
be arbitrary or fundamentally unfair. See id. at 553 ("[Tlhe imposition of American
criminal law ... is not arbitrary."); id. (finding that, in the circumstances that existed in the
case, the law's application "is unlikely to be arbitrary"); id. ("Nor do we perceive any
inherent unfairness in Brehm's prosecution.").
89. Id. at 552 (citing Davis, 905 F.2d at 248-49 (finding a sufficient nexus to exert
jurisdiction over a British national seized off the coast of California while attempting to
smuggle marijuana into the United States)); United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 111 (2d
Cir. 2003) (finding jurisdiction over foreign nationals tried for planning to carry out
terrorist bombings on American commercial aircraft in Asia).
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However, the Brehm court acknowledged that the nexus test did not
apply directly because, unlike the defendants in the other "nexus"
cases, "Brehm did not target his conduct toward American soil or
American commerce.""o However, the court decided that the nexus
requirement in the other circuits was a mere proxy for due process,"
and that another proxy existed in Brehm's case. There, "the
American influence was so pervasive" on the base that the court
found it to be "a suitable proxy for due process purposes, such that
the imposition of American criminal law there is not arbitrary."9 2 The
court explained some of the American interests at stake:
"preservation of law and order on the base, the maintenance of
military-related discipline, and the reallocation of Department of
Defense resources to confine Brehm, provide care for J.O., and
investigate the incident.""
Having dispensed with the nexus test by finding a suitable proxy,
the court moved on to consider whether international law impacted
the due process analysis. It found that the agreement between the
United States and Afghanistan made the exercise of jurisdiction nonarbitrary, and therefore weighed in favor of the Due Process Clause
being satisfied.94 The arrangement authorized the United States to
exercise its jurisdiction over "United States personnel" in
Afghanistan, including civilians." The court referred to United States
v. Angulo-Herndndez,9 6 a case in which the First Circuit had found
jurisdiction to be consistent with due process based on an
international agreement." The Brehm court then applied similar
reasoning to the case before it, explaining why the agreement
between the United States and Afghanistan satisfied the Due Process
Clause:
With Afghanistan having disclaimed any interest in prosecuting
criminal conduct ... by those situated similarly to Brehm, due

process is not offended by the United States stepping into the
90. Brehm, 691 F.3d at 552.
91. Id. at 552-53.
92. Id. at 553.
93. Id. at 552-53.
94. Id. at 553-54 (citing Personnel Agreement, supra note 74).
95. Id. (citing Personnel Agreement, supra note 74). The agreement states: "The
Government of Afghanistan recognizes the particular importance of disciplinary control
by United States military authorities over United States personnel and, therefore,
Afghanistan authorizes the United States Government to exercise criminal jurisdiction
over United States personnel." Personnel Agreement, supra note 74, at iv.
96. 565 F.3d 2 (1st Cir. 2009).
97. See Brehm, 691 F.3d at 553 (citing Angulo-Herndndez, 565 F.3d at 11).
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jurisdictional void. ... The risk of ... random lawlessness is
readily seen as inimical to the success of the military mission in
Afghanistan, and thus contrary to the American interest in that
mission. Insofar as the enactment of MEJA serves to
legitimately advance that interest, its application is unlikely to
be arbitrary.98
Third, the court found that there was "no inherent unfairness" in
the district court's exercise of jurisdiction over Brehm.9 9 He should
have known, the court reasoned, that committing an assault would
lead to prosecution, especially in light of the notice in his employment
contract that he might be subject to criminal jurisdiction in the United
States.10 As a result of these factors, the court deemed that the
district court's exercise of jurisdiction over Brehm was consistent with
due process.10 '
III. THE SHORTCOMINGS OF THE FOURTH CIRCUIT'S APPROACH
The Fourth Circuit's discussion of the due process issue was
unsatisfactory for several reasons. The court's reasoning is likely to
confuse lower courts because it combined three separate strands of
analysis-the American influence (the "proxy" for due process), the
basis in international law, and the lack of inherent unfairnesswithout explaining how those strands interrelate. 102 In addition, the
court's reasoning contained three specific deficiencies. First, it failed
to explain why the strong American influence on the military base
sufficed as a "proxy for due process," or even what "proxy for due
process" means. Second, it borrowed the international law approach
from some of the other circuits. As will be explained, this approach is
flawed. Third, the view that there was "no inherent unfairness" in
exercising jurisdiction over Brehm, though correct, was used in an
illogical place in the court's analysis.

98. Id.
99. Id. at 553-54.
100. See id. at 554.
101. Id.
102. It seems likely that courts will have to decide similar cases relatively frequently
given the Department of Defense's increasing use of contractors on overseas military
bases, many of whom are foreign nationals. See supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text.
MEJA will apply to almost every contractor that commits a crime while accompanying the
military, see supra notes 19-22 and accompanying text, and courts will then have to decide
whether the exercise of jurisdiction is consistent with due process.
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A.

The Lack of Clarity and Transparency
An unenviable task awaits lower courts, defendants, and law
enforcement authorities seeking to apply Brehm's reasoning, even to
a case with facts very similar to Brehm. The Fourth Circuit's opinion
lacked the clarity necessary to allow its precedent to be fully
understood or faithfully followed.
One source of confusion was the court's amalgamation of lines of
analysis that had previously been kept separate. 103 As discussed, the
court gave three separate reasons for finding that due process was
satisfied: the "pervasive" American influence, the foundation in
international law, and the absence of "inherent unfairness." "
However, the court failed to explain the interrelation between these
factors.10 Instead, it simply listed the reasons, without beginning or
ending its discussion with any indication of the significance or weight
of the individual factors at play. While most other circuits were
content to rely either on the nexus approach or the international law
approach,"o the Brehm court analyzed both, and also inserted its own,
proxy-based reasoning" It then moved on to consider whether there
was inherent unfairness in the exercise of jurisdiction. " The reader is
left guessing whether any one aspect of the court's reasoning was
dispositive or whether the court was deciding based on the totality of
the circumstances." The lack of explanation will limit Brehm's
103. Other courts have occasionally applied both the international law test and the
nexus test. However, they have only done so when they have explicitly found that due
process was satisfied under either test, and have therefore seen no need to choose between
them. See United States v. Delgado-Garcia, 374 F.3d 1337, 1343, 1345 (D.C. Cir. 2004);
United States v. Suerte, 291 F.3d 366, 375 (5th Cir. 2002). The Brehm court failed to
explain whether it believed the pervasive influence or the basis in international law would
each have been sufficient alone. See infra notes 104-10 and accompanying text. It also
failed to explain how the absence of inherent unfairness factored into its analysis. See infra
notes 104-10 and accompanying text.
104. See supra Part II.B.
105. See Brehm, 691 F.3d at 552-54; supra Part II.B.
106. See supra Part I.C.
107. See Brehm, 691 F.3d at 552-54.
108. See id. at 553-54.
109. Of course, the Fourth Circuit was limited by the facts of the case before it, and
could not have applied the law to every possible permutation of facts. However, in
deciding cases in other areas of law, the Fourth Circuit has provided comprehensive and
effective guidance in dicta. For example, the court has considered the application of the
subject-matter jurisdiction rules to inactive corporations. See Athena Auto., Inc. v.
DiGregorio, 166 F.3d 288, 290-92 (4th Cir. 1999). In holding that the corporation at issue
was subject to diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1), the court did not need to
determine the state in which the inactive corporation had its principal place of business.
Id. at 292. The court continued: "If, however, we were required to find a principal place of
business for applying § 1332, we might ... [apply] our 'nerve center test' .... " Id. When
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precedential value in cases with facts that are even slightly
different.110
In addition to the court's conflation of these three different
approaches, each of these individual approaches suffered from its
own particular deficiencies.
B.

The Court Should Not Have Determined Due Process by Proxy
There are significant problems with the court's conclusion that
the "pervasive" American influence on the NATO base was a
sufficient "proxy" for due process."' The court purportedly derived
its reasoning from two cases using the nexus approach: the decision of
the Ninth Circuit in Davis"' and the Second Circuit's opinion in
Yousef.x"3 However, by the Fourth Circuit's own admission, the facts
of Brehm did not satisfy the nexus test because, unlike in Davis and
Yousef, the defendant in Brehm "did not target his conduct toward
American soil or American commerce."114 Unable to rely on the
nexus analysis as the Second and Ninth Circuits had used it, the court
reasoned that the nexus approach was just an example of an
analytical framework serving as a proxy for due process.1 s The court
then held that the "pervasive American influence" could also be such
a proxy, and applied it to the facts to find that the exercise of
jurisdiction over Brehm satisfied due process. 1 16
One major problem is the court's choice of terminology. The
Fourth Circuit's language implies that the term "proxy for due

required to determine an inactive corporation's principal place of business several years
later, a lower court referred to the Athena Automotive decision as "guidance," and applied
the nerve center test. Toporek v. MBT Int'l, Inc., Civil Action No. 2:07-1610-CWH, 2007
WL 3306696, at *3-4 (D.S.C. Nov. 6, 2007).
110. For example, if the assault had taken place at a bar outside of a military base,
presumably negating the pervasive American influence as a basis of jurisdiction, would the
other factors have been sufficient to satisfy due process? Alternatively, would the exercise
of jurisdiction be consistent with due process if the two contractors had been based in a
country that did not have a jurisdictional agreement with the United States?
111. Brehm, 691 F.3d at 553 ("Although [the base] was not technically territory of the
United States, the American influence was so pervasive that we think it a suitable proxy
for due process purposes, such that the imposition of American criminal law there is not
arbitrary.").
112. 905 F.2d 245 (9th Cir. 1990). For an explanation of the Davis court's reasoning,
see supra note 56.
113. 327 F.3d 56 (2d Cir. 2003). For the Brehm court's discussion of Davis and Yousef,
see Brehm, 691 F.3d at 552.
114. See Brehm, 691 F.3d at 552-53.
115. See supra text accompanying notes 91-92.
116. Brehm, 691 F.3d at 553.
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process" is a term of art that is used by other courts in similar cases."'
This is not the case. Neither Davis nor Yousef uses the word
"proxy."" 8 In fact, no other court deciding a due process question in
the context of extraterritorial jurisdiction has ever mentioned a
"proxy" for due process. 19 Moreover, the term is not self-defining in
this context.120 It was therefore essential for the Fourth Circuit to
explain what it meant by a "proxy for due process," and why a proxy
is constitutionally legitimate. The court instead left this for lower
courts to decipher.
Given the plain meaning of the term "proxy" and the Fourth
Circuit'§ language, lower courts are most likely to find that the Fourth
Circuit intended to establish a "pervasive American influence" test as
an alternative method, alongside the nexus approach and the
international law approach, of establishing due process.12 ' This raises
a number of concerns. First, contrary to the court's suggestion, this
alternative test for due process is not supported by precedent.2 2 In
117. Id. at 552 ("Some courts have [used the nexus test] as a proxy for due
process....").
118. See Yousef, 327 F.3d at 111-12 (noting only that "there must be a sufficient nexus
between the defendant and the United States, so that such application would not be
arbitrary or fundamentally unfair" (citing United States v. Davis, 905 F.2d 245, 248-49
(9th Cir. 1990))); Davis, 905 F.2d at 248-49 (using the "nexus" language).
119. The author conducted a Westlaw terms and connectors search in the "All Federal
Cases" database using the following search string: " 'due process' & territor! /100
jurisdiction /100 proxy." The search yielded five results, of which only two were criminal
cases. Neither of those two cases used the word "proxy" in the context of analyzing
whether the exercise of jurisdiction was consistent with due process.
120. "Proxy" is defined as "[o]ne who is authorized to act as a substitute for another,"
and is perhaps most familiar in corporate law as "a person who is authorized to vote
another's stock shares." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1346 (9th. ed. 2009).
121. The court described the nexus approach as "a proxy for due process," Brehm, 691
F.3d at 552, and went on to label the pervasive American influence as another "suitable
proxy for due process purposes." Id. at 553. Taking into account the notion of a proxy as a
substitute, see supra note 120, the court's language indicates that the nexus test is one test
for due process, and the "pervasive American influence test" is another. In other words, in
order to comply with the Due Process Clause, the exercise of jurisdiction must satisfy one
of the alternative tests. Another possible interpretation is that the court saw the
"pervasive American influence" as a type of nexus, so that the nexus approach was
satisfied on the facts. This appears to be a more strained interpretation. If the facts had
satisfied the nexus test, the court would have stated this in a far more straightforward
manner. There would have been no need to introduce the proxy language. In addition, the
court's language shows that it intended to distinguish Brehm from the nexus cases, rather
than drawing parallels with them: "It is undoubtedly the case that, unlike the defendants in
Davis and Yousef, Brehm did not target his conduct toward American soil or American
commerce." Brehm, 691 F.3d at 552.
122. As discussed, no other court uses the word "proxy" in this area of the law. See
supra notes 118-19 and accompanying text. More importantly, no other court suggests that
there should be several different tests available. Some courts apply the nexus test, see
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addition, it is unclear why the presence of a proxy, such as the
pervasive American influence on the base, means that jurisdiction is
consistent with the Due Process Clause. The court acknowledged the
rationale behind the nexus approach: when a nexus exists, courts have
found the exercise of jurisdiction to be neither arbitrary nor
fundamentally unfair. 123 In fact, the need for jurisdiction to be neither
arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair is the only aspect of this area of
the law on which all courts are able to agree.124 Other circuits have
justified their chosen test by explaining why satisfaction of the test is
indicative of an absence of arbitrariness or unfairness.125 The Fourth
Circuit is silent on the question of why an American influence, in the
absence of a nexus, should be sufficient to establish due process.
The Brehm court's omission of an explanation leaves the reader
to supply the missing link between the "pervasive American
influence" and the satisfaction of the Due Process Clause. However,
it is far from clear that the American influence alone should be
sufficient. The opinion identified the American interests at stake as
the resources required to treat the victim, detain the defendant, and
investigate the crime. 126 If these are sufficient to establish due process,
was the court suggesting that due process depends on to the interests
of the United States rather than fairness to the defendant? Such a
suggestion would be problematic. First, it would distort the nature of
the Due Process Clause, which provides individual defendants with

supra notes 48-58 and accompanying text, and others apply the international law
approach, see supra notes 35-47 and accompanying text. When courts have used both
tests, this has only been because both tests are satisfied on the facts and the court need not
choose between them. See supra note 103. The cases that the Fourth Circuit cites do not
view a nexus as one way of establishing due process, but as the only way. See, e.g., Yousef,
327 F.3d at 111 (citing Davis, 905 F.2d at 248-249) (explicitly adopting the nexus standard
from the Ninth Circuit)); Davis, 905 F.2d at 248-49 ("In order to apply extraterritorially a
federal criminal statute to a defendant consistently with due process, there must be a
sufficient nexus between the defendant and the United States ... so that such application
would not be arbitrary or fundamentally unfair." (internal citations omitted)); see also
United States v. Al Kassar, 660 F.3d 108, 118 (2d Cir. 2011) (repeating the nexus test and
further explaining that, "[f]or non-citizens acting entirely abroad, a jurisdictional nexus
exists when the aim of that activity is to cause harm inside the United States or to U.S.
citizens or interests").
123. See Brehm, 691 F.3d at 553-52.
124. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
125. For example, when there is a nexus between the defendant's criminal conduct and
the United States, "it cannot be argued seriously that the defendant('s] conduct was so
unrelated to American interests as to render their prosecution in the United States
arbitrary or fundamentally unfair" because of the threat posed to the nation and its
citizens. Yousef, 327 F.3d at 112.
126. See Brehm, 691 F.3d at 553.
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procedural rights.127 The interests of the United States should not
dictate the defendant's procedural rights. Second, the suggestion
would mean that the Due Process Clause would be satisfied in
virtually every case because it is difficult to imagine a federal
prosecution in which the United States does not have an interest. The
court also noted that the United States had an interest in exercising
jurisdiction over Brehm as part of its concern with maintaining law,
order, and discipline on the base. 128 However, the court failed to
explain why it was non-arbitrary to simply assume that the United
States' responsibility for maintaining law, order, and discipline on the
base encompassed Brehm's prosecution. Was this conclusion a
function of the sheer number of American troops that were stationed
on the base, or was it because both the defendant and the victim were
working for Department of Defense contractors? There was no
mention in the opinion of the involvement of South Africa, the home
country of the defendant,129 or the United Kingdom, the home
country of the victim.' Were either of these nations in a position to
prosecute Brehm, and, if so, would this have made a difference to
whether the American influence was sufficient to establish
jurisdiction?
The third concern is the implications of the proxy-based
reasoning for future cases. Even if lower courts accept that the new
concept of proxies allows alternative tests for due process, and that
the pervasive American influence is one such test, will they assume
that there will also be others? If so, how will they determine what
these other alternatives are? As discussed previously, the Fourth
Circuit was not required, or even able, to discuss every possible
permutation of facts that may arise in another case.' 3 ' However, its
conclusion that an American influence is a "proxy for due process,"
without any coherent explanation or limitation, tells lower courts
nothing more than that due process will be satisfied when the court
finds that it is satisfied. As lower courts will struggle to resolve this
puzzle, the uncertainty will afflict both defendants and the
government. It will be difficult for both sides to assess whether, in any

127. U.S. CONST. amend. V ("No person shall ... be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law." (emphasis added)); see also Colangelo, supra note
33, at 169 (describing the rights contained in the Due Process Clause as "personal to the
accused").
128. See infra note 135 and accompanying text.
129. See Brehm, 691 F.3d at 549.
130. See id.
131. See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
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given case, jurisdiction is consistent with due process according to the
Fourth's Circuit's circular "proxy" test.
C.

The Court's Reliance on the InternationalLaw Approach Was
Problematic
The Brehm court's partial reliance on the international law
approach was misplaced because that approach itself is highly flawed.
The court adopted the international law approach only implicitly, and
only as one of several bases for jurisdiction.132 Nonetheless, although
several circuits have embraced this approach,1 3 any automatic
determination of due process by reference to international law is
logically unsatisfactory.
1. The Brehm Court Adopted the International Law Approach
In relying on the Personnel Agreement"' between the United
States and Afghanistan, the court was unmistakably adopting the
international law approach. The agreement was a bilateral treaty,
giving the United States the ability, as a matter of international law,
to exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction over those working with the
American military in Afghanistan. The Fourth Circuit found that,
because jurisdiction existed under the treaty, jurisdiction was also
consistent with the Due Process Clause.136 In reaching this conclusion,
the court explicitly followed a First Circuit decision that adopted the
international law approach. 37
132. See Brehm, 691 F.3d at 553-54 (citing Personnel Agreement, supra note 74). For
an explanation of the different bases of jurisdiction that the court used, see supra Part

II.B.
133. See, e.g., United States v. Angulo-Hernindez, 565 F.3d 2, 10-11 (1st Cir. 2009)

("[D]ue process does not require the government to prove a nexus between a defendant's
criminal conduct and the United States in a prosecution under [federal law] when the flag
nation has consented to the application of United States law to the defendants." (citing
United States v. Cardales, 168 E.3d 548, 552 (1st Cir. 1999))); United States v. Rendon, 354
F.3d 1320, 1325 (11th Cir. 2003) ("[T]his circuit ... [has] not embellished the MDLEA
with a nexus requirement."); United States v. Perez-Oviedo, 281 F.3d 400, 402-03 (3d Cir.
2002); United States v. Martinez-Hidalgo, 993 F.2d 1052, 1056 (3d Cir.1993).
134. Personnel Agreement, supra note 74, at iv.
135. See id. The United States describes this document as a bilateral treaty. See U.S.
DEP'T OF STATE, BILATERAL TREATIES INFORCE AS OF NOVEMBER 1, 2007, at 1 (2007),
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/83017.pdf. A treaty, also known as an
international agreement, is a source of international law. SLOMANSON, supra note 40, at

19.
136. Brehm, 691 F.3d at 553.
137. Id. (citing Angulo-Herndndez, 565 F.3d at 11). In Angulo-Herndndez, the First

Circuit found that jurisdiction was consistent with due process because Bolivia, the flag
nation of the vessel in which the defendants were arrested, had consented to the United
States's exercise of jurisdiction. Angulo-Herndndez, 565 F.3d at 11.
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A potential counterargument to this characterization of the
court's approach is that the court was not simply relying on the
international agreement, but was instead finding due process to be
satisfied based on the particular circumstances of the case. After all,
the court found that "Afghanistan [had] disclaimed any interest in
prosecuting criminal conduct ...

by those situated similarly to

Brehm," and that the United States had an interest in exercising
jurisdiction in response to "[t]he risk of ... random lawlessness." 1a
Arguably, the United States does have some general interest in
preventing crime and enforcing the law in combat areas. However,
the agreement established that, as a matter of international law,
enforcing law and order was the responsibility of the United States
rather than Afghanistan. 3 9 The court was using what is widely
recognized under international law as the "territorial principle,"
whereby a "state has jurisdiction to prescribe and enforce a rule of
law in the territory of another state to the extent provided by
international agreement with the other state." 40 The Brehm court
was therefore relying directly on international law to determine
whether the Due Process Clause was satisfied, which is the essence of
the international law approach.141
138. Brehm, 691 F.3d at 553.
139. See Personnel Agreement, supra note 74, at iv ("The Government of Afghanistan
recognizes the particular importance of disciplinary control by United States military
authorities over United States personnel and, therefore, Afghanistan authorizes the
United States Government to exercise criminal jurisdiction over United States
personnel.").
140. United States v. Cardales, 168 F.3d 548, 553 (1st Cir. 1999) (quoting United States
v. Robinson, 843 F.2d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1988)).
141. In addition, as discussed above, a court should not condition due process purely
on the interests of the United States. See supra note 127 and accompanying text. As a
result, it is unsatisfactory to conclude that international agreements like this give the
United States an interest that automatically justifies the exercise of jurisdiction within the
bounds of the Due Process Clause. A second potential counterargument is that
Afghanistan, by entering into the agreement, ceded some of its territory to the United
States. As a result, one may argue, the Brehm court was not really deciding on whether the
exercise of extraterritorialjurisdiction comported with the Due Process Clause. Instead,
perhaps, the court was deciding that the United States was simply exercising jurisdiction
within its extended territory. This argument does not withstand scrutiny. The court did not
discuss any transfer of territorial jurisdiction, and explicitly stated that the United States
was exercising its jurisdiction extraterritorially. Brehm, 691 F.3d at 552 (referring to "a
criminal statute having extraterritorial reach"). In addition, nothing in the agreement
suggests any transfer of territory. See Personnel Agreement, supra note 74, at iv. There is
no indication that the agreement would allow the United States to prosecute anybody who
happened to be present on the base; only "United States personnel," including non-citizen
contractors, are covered. See id. Furthermore, the agreement does not restrict American
control over its contractors to the geographic boundaries of the base. See id. On the face of
the agreement, the United States could prosecute one of its contractors for a crime
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2. The International Law Approach Is Fundamentally Flawed
Regardless of how the Fourth Circuit employed it in this case,
the international law approach is logically and practically unsound.
Whether or not a government action, such as a criminal prosecution,
is consistent with international law is a distinct question from whether
or not the action is consistent with the United States Constitution.142
The Constitution and international law have been developed by
different actors, for different purposes, and to regulate conduct
between different parties.'43 Although both happen to address the
issue of jurisdiction, they approach the issue from different angles.
Some of the jurisdictional rules that exist under international law only
concern the relations between states, without any regard for the rights
of the individual defendant." The Due Process Clause concerns the
relationship between the United States and an individual.14 5 In this
context, it determines whether the exercise of jurisdiction over the
individual is fair and non-arbitrary. 146 As a result, it seems
counterintuitive to assume, as several circuits do, that international
law and the Due Process Clause are equivalent on questions of
jurisdiction. None of the courts adopting the international law
approach has provided any explanation of why two completely
different bodies of law should happen to converge so precisely on the
issue of jurisdiction.

committed anywhere in Afghanistan. See id. The agreement did not, therefore, give rise to
any transfer of territory.
142. See, e.g., Brilmayer & Norchi, supra note 27, at 1221-22.
143. SLOMANSON, supra note 40, at 3, 5 (defining international law as "the body of
rules by which nations are bound in their mutual relations," but also acknowledging that
some aspects of international law have come to apply to other actors, including
individuals); OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAw 4 (Sir Robert Jennings & Sir Arthur
Watts eds., 9th ed. 1996) ("International law is the body of rules which are legally binding
on states in their intercourse with each other. These rules are primarily those which
govern the relations of states, but states are not the only subjects of international law."
(citations omitted)).
144. For example, jurisdiction under international law may be based only on a
unilateral agreement between two countries. See Colangelo, supra note 33, at 169 ("[I]f
Fifth Amendment due process rights are truly personal to the accused, how can
international law rules prescribing the jurisdictional reach of governments impair or
reduce the fundamental liberty rights of individuals?").
145. U.S. CONST. amend. V ("No person shall ... be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law." (emphasis added)).
146. See United States v. Ali, 885 F. Supp. 2d 55, 59 (D.C. Cir. 2012); United States v.
Ibarguen-Mosquera, 634 F.3d 1370, 1378 (11th Cir. 2011); United States v. Cardales, 168
F.3d 148, 553 (1st Cir. 1999); United States v. Martinez-Hidalgo, 993 F.2d 1052, 1056 (3d
Cir. 1993); United States v. Davis, 905 F.2d 245, 248-49 (9th Cir. 1990).
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More fundamentally, the Constitution cannot logically be tied to
international law. It is a fundamental principle of constitutional law
that the Constitution constrains the legislative power of Congress.147
Courts will not give effect to an act of Congress that is
unconstitutional; they will instead strike the statute down. 14 8 By
contrast, Congress is not constrained by international law. Courts will
give effect to a statute that directly contradicts international law,
provided Congress makes clear its intention to legislate inconsistently
with its international obligations. 49
However, the Brehm court, and several other circuits, tie the Due
Process Clause and international law together.s 0 This has the effect of
"constitutionalizing" the jurisdictional requirements of international
law."s' Because the Constitution takes precedence over a statute, this
approach means that Congress and other branches of government can
no longer take actions that are contrary to international law.1 12
Whatever the constraints of international law on the issue of
147. This occurs in two broad ways. First, the Constitution limits the legislative
authority of Congress. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 566 (1995)
(describing the powers of Congress as "limited to those powers enumerated in the
Constitution"). This first limitation on Congress was the subject of the first holding in
Brehm: that Congress had the authority to make MEJA apply extraterritorially to
defendants in Brehm's position. United States v. Brehm, 691 F.3d 547, 552 (4th Cir. 2012),
cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 808 (2012). The second type of limitation is the type that is relevant
to the second holding in Brehm, and to this Recent Development: Even when Congress
legislates within the scope of its authority, its legislation will be unconstitutional if it is
inconsistent with a constitutional right, such as a right existing under the Due Process
Clause. Id.
148. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 180 (1803) ("[A] law repugnant to the
constitution is void .... ").
149. Hong Long & Shanghai Banking Corp. v. Simon, 153 F.3d 991, 995 (9th Cir. 1998)
("Congress has the unquestioned authority to enforce its laws beyond the territorial
boundaries of the United States.... Whether Congress has exercised that authority in a
particular case is a matter of statutory construction[,] ... [and the court begins] with the
presumption that the legislation of Congress, unless a contrary intent appears, is meant to
apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States." (citations omitted)
(internal quotation marks omitted)); Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 60607 (1889) (holding that a statute was still enforceable, even thought it was in direct conflict
with a U.S. treaty obligation); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS
LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §§ 111(1), 115(1)(a) (2012) (stating that when a U.S. court is
applying a domestic statute that conflicts with a rule of customary international law, the
statute overrides the treaty obligation). An example of Congress explicitly legislating
contrary to international law on an issue of jurisdiction can be found in the U.S. Maritime
Drug Enforcement Laws: "[A] failure to comply with international law shall not divest a
court of jurisdiction or otherwise constitute a defense to any proceeding under this
chapter." 47 U.S.C.A. § 70505 (West 2009 & Supp. 2012).
150. See supra notes 35-47 and accompanying text.
151. See Weisburd, supra note 29, at 382.
152. Id.
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jurisdiction, those will also exist under the Due Process Clause. The
U.S. government is then bound by those constraints, whether or not
Congress expressly intends to contradict them. The international law
approach therefore fundamentally changes the nature of the
relationship between the United States and its international
obligations.
As a result, the approach makes the jurisdiction of a U.S. district
court both too narrow (by making it impossible for the court to
exercise jurisdiction in any circumstance in which that exercise would
not conform to international law) and too broad (by allowing the Due
Process Clause to extend to the outer limit of jurisdiction under
international law).'5 When viewed in this light, wherein the
Constitution is deprived of any independent effect, the international
law approach does not seem appealing. Views remain divided as to
whether American judges should look beyond this country's borders
in interpreting the Constitution. '" However, even the strongest
proponent of using foreign law would see it as only one of several
tools of interpretation."' No jurist has gone so far as to say that nonAmerican law should be dispositive in determining the content of the
Constitution. Taken to its logical conclusion, the international law
approach breaks new, undesirable ground.
153. As the Ninth Circuit noted when disavowing the international law approach,
"danger exists that emphasis on international law principles will cause us to lose sight of
the ultimate question: would application of the statute to the defendant be arbitrary or
fundamentally unfair?" United States v. Davis, 905 F.2d 245, 249 n.2 (9th Cir. 1990).
154. CompareJustice Antonin Scalia, Introductory Remarks to OutsourcingAmerican
http://www.c-spanvideo.org
Law, AM. ENTERPRISE INST. (Feb. 21, 2006),
/program/191294-3 (arguing that "foreign legal material can never be relevant to an
interpretation of ... the United States Constitution"), with Austen L. Parrish, Storm in a
Teacup: The U.S. Supreme Court's Use of Foreign Law, 2007 U. ILL. L. REv. 637, 637
(2007) (arguing that the Supreme Court's use of foreign law is "not illegitimate" and that
objections are overstated).
155. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 573 (2003) (reviewing, as part of the Court's
consideration of whether the Due Process Clause provided a right to homosexual sodomy,
a decision of the European Court of Human Rights that found a right to private,
consensual sexual conduct between a same-sex couple). But see id. at 598 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) ("[T]his Court ... should not impose foreign moods, fads, or fashions on
Americans." (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)). Of course, there is a
clear distinction between the discussion of foreign law and the influence of international
law. International law, in some senses at least, is binding on the United States, whereas
foreign law is clearly not. However, the analogy is noteworthy. It should also be noted that
some aspects of international law may be directly incorporated into American domestic
law. See generally JORDAN J. PAUST, INTERNATIONAL LAW AS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES 415 (2003) (observing that some aspects of international law are directly
incorporated under Article VI, Clause 2 of the Constitution). This Recent Development's
thesis is that it should not be so incorporated into the consideration of jurisdiction under
the Due Process Clause.
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One counterargument is that courts using the international law
approach may not have intended to go as far as described. Instead,
these courts may have simply found, as a matter of fact, that the
current international law standard happens to be sufficiently
reasonable and non-arbitrary to meet the requirements of due
process. However, this argument is not persuasive, primarily because
it does not properly reflect the type of analysis in which courts are
engaging."' Courts adopting the international law approach do not
appear to be making any attempt to compare the international
jurisdictional standards with the requirements of due process. They
are not setting out criteria for ensuring that jurisdiction is fair and
non-arbitrary, and then comparing the international standards with
those criteria. Instead, judges are simply concluding that, provided
international law is satisfied, there is no constitutional problem."s'
The courts are not, therefore, finding that the current international
and constitutional standards are equivalent; they are taking the less
rigorous route of analysis, and merely concluding that whenever
jurisdiction is proper under international law, it automatically
comports with due process.5 8 For the reasons discussed, the Brehm
156. A second problem with the counterargument is that even if judges taking the
international law approach are, in their own minds, merely drawing a parallel between the
current requirements of international law and the demands of the Due Process Clause,
they are confusing their audiences. By conflating the two questions, the courts are
suggesting to parties and lower courts that due process is automatically satisfied when
jurisdiction is consistent with international law. For all of the reasons discussed, this
understanding is both mistaken and problematic. As a result, even if the alternative
explanation of the international law approach is accepted, the approach remains
unsatisfactory.
157. See United States v. Ibarguen-Mosquera, 634 F.3d 1370, 1379 (11th Cir. 2011)
(concluding that due process was satisfied because international law permitted the United
States to exercise jurisdiction over stateless vessels); United States v. Rendon, 354 F.3d
1320, 1325 (11th Cir. 2003) (avoiding a full due process analysis and simply citing to other
circuits that endorse the international law approach); United States v. Perez-Oviedo, 281
F.3d 400, 403 (3d Cir. 2002) (finding that no due process violation existed because the
foreign national defendant's government consented to the exercise of jurisdiction over the
defendant); United States v. Cardales, 168 F.3d 548, 553 (1st Cir. 1999) ("[DJue process
does not require the government to prove a nexus between a defendant's criminal conduct
and the United States ... when the flag nation has consented to the application of United
States law to the defendants.").
158. This would be a problem if the jurisdictional requirements under international law
changed. The courts' current approach would not allow them to determine whether the
new rules on jurisdiction still complied with the Constitution because courts are not
comparing the two bodies of law; they are simply concluding that jurisdiction under
international law will automatically satisfy the Due Process Clause. To be sure, the
jurisdictional requirements of international law are not changing by the day. At the same
time, they are certainly not insulated from change. Many of the rules governing
jurisdiction under international law are derived from custom. See The S.S. Lotus (Fr. v.
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court should have avoided this approach, and all courts should avoid
the approach in the future. 59
D.

The "No Inherent Unfairness" RationaleIs Necessary but Not
Sufficient
Having discussed both the proxy and international law
approaches, the court went on to explain that jurisdiction was
consistent with due process because there was "no inherent
unfairness" in subjecting Brehm to jurisdiction in the United States.16 o
Although the court was correct to conclude that there was "no
inherent unfairness" in subjecting Brehm to jurisdiction in the United
States, this should not, by itself, have been a sufficient basis for
finding that jurisdiction was consistent with due process. The court
found that Brehm had fair warning that, by committing his criminal
acts, he would be prosecuted somewhere.'61 Fairness, the court
reasoned, did not require a defendant to be aware that he could be
subject to prosecution in the United States in particular.162 The
conclusion that the exercise of jurisdiction over Brehm was not
inherently unfair seems to be based on sound policy, provided it is
considered at the appropriate place in the analysis. It is unfair for a
defendant to be subject to extraterritorial jurisdiction when he has no
reason to know that his conduct will be subject to prosecution in a
foreign country.' It made sense for the Fourth Circuit to join the
Tur.), 1927 P.C.I.J. 26 (ser. A) No. 10 (Sept. 7) (determining jurisdiction by reference to
the practice of "the courts of many countries"). Customary international law is unlikely to
change overnight. See IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 5-7

(4th ed. 1990) (explaining that a norm of customary international law develops not just as
a result of states' customary practice, but as a result of this practice being settled and
recognized as binding). However, a United States court could find jurisdiction called
"universal by treaty" under international law as a result of a bilateral or multilateral treaty
to which the United States is a party. JORDAN J. PAUST ET AL., INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 95 (3d ed. 2007).

159. However, as this Recent Development will propose, there is a way for courts, by
adopting a more nuanced understanding of the relationship between international law and
the Constitution, to harness some of the wisdom of international law in making their
judgments. See infra Part IV.B.
160. See supra notes 99-101 and accompanying text.
161. See United States v. Brehm, 691 F.3d 547, 554 (4th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S.
Ct. 808 (2012).
162. Id. (citing United States v. Al Kassar, 660 F.3d 108, 119 (2d Cir. 2011)).
163. For example, if a defendant's conduct was legal where it was performed, and the
defendant had no reason to believe that the United States had any particular interest in
asserting jurisdiction, there would be a strong argument that it would be unfair for the
United States to in fact exercise jurisdiction. "If a crime is not evil in itself, but is only
criminal because it is declared so by a legislature, then it is malum prohibitum." DANIEL
E. HALL, CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE 60 (6th ed. 2012). On the other hand, if the
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majority of its fellow circuits in considering, as part of the due process
analysis, whether jurisdiction is fundamentally unfair.
However, the "no inherent unfairness" analysis is only
appropriate at a certain point in a court's reasoning. The other
circuits uniformly require that jurisdiction be both non-arbitrary and
not inherently unfair." Following this line of reasoning, the presence
of inherent unfairness should negate due process, but the absence of
inherent unfairness should not, by itself, satisfy due process. In other
words, a court should consider any last-resort argument by a
defendant that the exercise of jurisdiction is inherently unfair, but
should not use the defendant's "fair warning" of the criminal nature
of his conduct as the sole basis of jurisdiction. Using this as an
independent basis for jurisdiction would defeat the entire purpose of
the due process analysis. If due process were satisfied every time a
malum in se act was committed abroad, this would eliminate all
considerations of whether it was non-arbitrary to subject the
defendant to jurisdiction in the United States. This would be
undesirable and would contradict courts' current position requiring
that jurisdiction be both non-arbitrary and not inherently unfair.'
IV. MAKING SENSE OF BREHM

Notice is the unifying thread that ties together the conflicted
jurisprudence in this area, and is the factor that should have been
decisive in Brehm. All courts should focus on notice as the core
concept in determining whether the exercise of extraterritorial
jurisdiction is consistent with the Due Process Clause. Notice should
be relevant to the two criteria: non-arbitrariness and inherent
fairness. First, courts should ask whether the exercise of jurisdiction
defendant's conduct is of the kind that is considered malum in se, there is much less of a
compelling argument that American jurisdiction is unfair. See id. ("If a crime is inherently
evil, it is malum in se."). These crimes should be carefully distinguished from the
overlapping but distinct category of crimes of universal jurisdiction. A crime is one of
universal jurisdiction when it is not only universally condemned, but considered so serious
that all countries have a role in enforcing the crime. See infra notes 173-76 and
accompanying text.
164. See supra notes 34-58 and accompanying text.
165. Due to its opaque reasoning, it remains unclear whether or not the Brehm court
intended to use the "no inherent unfairness" rationale as an independent basis for
jurisdiction, or as a final safety valve for the defendant. The court may have intended to
use it in the latter sense, having already cited the proxy argument and the international
law approach as other bases for jurisdiction. Brehm, 691 F.3d at 552-53. However, as
discussed above in detail, see supra Parts III.B-C, neither of those bases provides a
satisfactory basis for due process, which leaves the "no inherent unfairness" rationale as
the court's last remaining argument in favor of jurisdiction.
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over the defendant is non-arbitrary. It will be non-arbitrary if the
defendant had actual or constructive notice that he could be subject
to the laws of the United States generally.166 If jurisdiction is nonarbitrary, courts should move on to the second step: fundamental
fairness. Jurisdiction should only be deemed inherently unfair if the
defendant demonstrates that he lacked actual or constructive notice
that his specific conduct was criminal under the laws of the United
States. The "inherent unfairness" step should not easily defeat
jurisdiction because the defendant will only be able to show a lack of
constructive notice if three criteria are satisfied: the act was legal
where committed, the act was not inherently wrong by nature (i.e. it
was malum prohibitum rather than malum in se), and the defendant
had no other reason to believe that the act was criminalized in the
United States.
Viewing the cases through the lens of notice would reconcile the
circuit split that currently exists. Courts can decide the second
"inherent unfairness" step in a uniform manner in all types of cases
because the criteria, stated above, are straightforward. However, the
first step, which asks whether the exercise of jurisdiction is nonarbitrary, is more complex. Different vehicles may be used to reach
the concept of notice in different types of cases. This Section will
show first that the nexus approach can be explained by reference to
notice and, second, that courts can use international law in certain
cases to gain insight into the question of constructive notice. Finally,
this Section will show that Brehm itself can be explained on the basis
of the defendant's actual notice.
Notice Explains the Nexus Approach
The notice principle explains cases in which courts have required
a nexus between the defendant and the United States. When a
defendant's actions are aimed at causing negative effects within the
United States, this aim provides a clear basis for the non-arbitrary
exercise of jurisdiction because the defendant has constructive notice
that he will be subject to the laws of the United States. As the Second
Circuit explained, when an extraterritorial crime is directed at the

A.

166. But see Brilmayer & Norchi, supra note 27, at 1243 (arguing against a notice-based
approach to due process "because states can avoid surprise simply by making it clear that
they will subject all litigants in their courts to local law," and adding that "[i]f mere notice
would suffice, the fairness requirement would be empty, for such notice could always be
provided"). This criticism appears to envisage a more generalized form of notice than this
Recent Development suggests. A decree by a state's courts that they will apply local law
would rarely seem to provide a defendant with actual or constructive notice.
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United States or its citizens, "it cannot be argued seriously that the
defendants' conduct was so unrelated to American interests as to
render their prosecution in the United States arbitrary."' 7 When a
defendant's conduct threatens the United States, he should be on
notice that the laws of the United States will apply to him. The nexus
is therefore one way in which a court can find the required
constructive notice."
The Notice Test Can Draw on Principlesof InternationalLaw
The available bases for jurisdiction under international law will
often provide courts with a valuable clue as to whether jurisdiction is
consistent with the Due Process Clause. The concepts of jurisdiction
under international law and under the Constitution are distinct, and
must be analyzed separately." This Recent Development has
advocated against the "international law approach," which conflates
the two concepts.' 7 0 However, "although principles of international
law might not determine conclusively the constitutionality of
Congress's extraterritorial legislative reach, they nonetheless inform
the analysis.""' If jurisdiction exists under certain bases of
international law, this will demonstrate that the defendant had
constructive notice that the laws of the United States applied to him,
thus satisfying the non-arbitrariness requirement. This subsection will
first discuss the bases of international jurisdiction that should be
sufficient to satisfy the non-arbitrariness standard under the Due
Process Clause and will then explain those that should not be
sufficient.
B.

1. Some Principles of International Law Assist the Analysis Under
the Due Process Clause
There is widespread agreement that the jurisdictional component
of due process is always satisfied when the United States is exercising

167. United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 112 (2d Cir. 2003).
168. Of course, this would not have helped the Brehm court because "Brehm did not
target his conduct toward American soil[,] ... American commerce," or American
citizens. Brehm, 691 F.3d at 552.
169. PAUST, supra note 155, at 415 ("[A] threshold inquiry should be whether or not
there is a basis for jurisdiction under international law. If not, our courts must decline
jurisdiction. And conversely, if jurisdiction is possible under international law but is not
permissible under the Constitution, it would be equally . .. improper for a court to
exercise jurisdiction.").
170. See supra Part III.C.
171. Colangelo, supranote 33, at 169.
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universal jurisdiction under international law.17 2 Universal jurisdiction
exists over certain crimes that are "sufficiently heinous to be crimes
against the entire community of nations.""' These include piracy,
torture, and war crimes." 4 Countries are not only permitted to
exercise jurisdiction over such crimes, but may be obligated to play a
role in their enforcement, whether by allowing extradition or by
themselves prosecuting."' When adjudicating crimes of this character,
a U.S. court is not just enforcing American law, but also a law that is
globally recognized and thus applied to the defendant regardless of
the location or target of his criminal actions. 7 6 Because the offense is
internationally proscribed and enforced, the defendant has
constructive notice of the application of the law to him. 17 The
exercise of jurisdiction over him is therefore not arbitrary. 7 1
172. See id. at 124-25; see also Brilmayer & Norchi, supra note 27, at 1253 ("In the
context of universal jurisdiction, the exercise of extensive congressional powers seems
unproblematic because only especially heinous crimes, as identified by international law,
give rise to the power to prosecute without a nexus."); Lichter, supra note 38, at 1945
("Assertions of universal jurisdiction ... satisfy Fifth Amendment due process notice
requirements per se.").
173. SLOMANSON, supra note 40, at 214.
174. OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 143, at 469-70.
175. SLOMANSON, supra note 40, at 214 ("Any nation where the perpetrator is found is
expected to arrest and try the perpetrator or extradite the criminal to a State that will
prosecute.").
176. United States v. Furlong, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 144, 147-48 (1820) (finding that
piracy "is against all, and punished by all ... within this universal jurisdiction"); Brilmayer
& Norchi, supra note 27, at 1253; Colangelo, supra note 33, at 124-25 ("Because the
proscription is not just one of national law, but also of a pre-existing and universally
applicable international law, the accused cannot claim to be shielded from the application
of a prohibition to which he is already and always subject.").
177. Colangelo, supra note 33, at 167-68 ("[B]ecause the legal prohibition on universal
crimes is fundamentally international . . . defendants cannot claim lack of notice of the law
as applied to them."); see also id. at 124-25 (explaining that, when jurisdiction is being
exercised, "the accused cannot claim lack of notice of the illegality of his conduct, or for
that matter, of the substantive law being applied to him").
178. When the crime is one of universal jurisdiction, the exercise of jurisdiction will
surely always satisfy the "no inherent unfairness" step in addition to the non-arbitrariness
step. See supra text accompanying notes 161-62. Constructive notice may not be easily
established if there is disagreement as to whether or not the crime is subject to universal
jurisdiction. However, these cases are likely to be extremely rare, as the list of universal
crimes is relatively well-defined. That list includes piracy, war crimes, apartheid, slave
trading, the hijacking and sabotage of aircraft, and serious breaches of the humanitarian
principles embodied in the Geneva Convention of 1949. OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL
LAW, supra note 143, at 469-70; SLOMANSON, supra note 40, at 214. Significant debate
surrounds whether certain additional crimes are subject to universal jurisdiction. See
Theodor Meron, International Criminalizationof Internal Atrocities, AM. J. INT'L L. 554,
569 (1995) ("[I]t is increasingly recognized by leading commentators that the crime of
genocide ... may also be cause for prosecution by any state."). See generally Luz E. Nagle,
Terrorism and Universal Jurisdiction: Opening a Pandora'sBox?, 27 GA. ST. U. L. REV.
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Other bases for jurisdiction under international law may also
inform the due process analysis. For example, the nexus the court
identified in Davis was the defendant's aim of causing criminal acts
within the United States.7 9 This link between the defendant and the
United States would also be sufficient to establish jurisdiction under
international law by way of the objective territoriality principle.'8 o
Under that principle, international law recognizes that a nation may
exercise jurisdiction over a defendant whose extraterritorial act
caused harmful effects within the nation's borders.'"' Again, it would
be inappropriate to find that due process was satisfied just because
there was some international basis for jurisdiction. However, when
the objective territoriality principle allows jurisdiction, this will
usually also supply a rationale for due process. If the defendant is
aiming conduct at the United States, causing detrimental effects
within its territory, it will not be arbitrary for an American court to
exercise jurisdiction. Similarly, international law permits a nation to
exercise jurisdiction over its own nationals, no matter where their
crimes may be committed. 2 When the United States is exercising
jurisdiction over one of its own citizens, it appears that the Due
Process Clause will also be satisfied in most cases because the citizen
will usually have the requisite actual or constructive notice.
2. Other Bases of Jurisdiction Under International Law Do Not
Assist the Due Process Analysis
In other instances, the basis for jurisdiction under international
law does not supply any appropriate rationale for due process. For
example, some courts have found that jurisdiction over defendants
accused of crimes on a flag vessel is consistent with due process when
339 (2011) (analyzing whether terrorism is a crime of universal jurisdiction). Not only will
these borderline cases be rare, but it will be even rarer that they exist without giving rise to
another basis for constructive notice. For example, jurisdiction over a defendant whose
terrorist acts are aimed at causing effects within the United States would exist under the
objective territoriality principle of international law. See infra note 180 and accompanying
text. As discussed, constructive notice will be present in such cases, and due process would
therefore be satisfied under the notice principle, because a defendant aiming to cause
negative effects in the United States should be aware of the potential application of
American law. See supra note 168.
179. United States v. Davis, 905 F.2d 245, 249 (1990) (quoting United States v.
Peterson, 812 F.2d 486,493 (9th Cir. 1987)).
180. Colangelo, supra note 33, at 169 (citing Davis, 905 F.2d at 249).
181. SLOMANSON, supra note 40, at 209-10.
182. Where a country is exercising jurisdiction over one of its own citizens, it appears
that the requisite actual or constructive notice will usually be present. This concept is
widely known under international law as the nationality principle. SLOMANSON, supra
note 40, at 212.
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the flag nation has consented to the exercise of jurisdiction by the
United States.183 The consent of the flag nation may satisfy
international law, but it should have no bearing on due process. The
personal rights belonging to the defendant should not be subject to
alteration by a political agreement between two governments. 1
Looking at the situation from the perspective of the defendant, the
exercise of American jurisdiction is both unfair and arbitrary because
the defendant "would have a legitimate expectation that ... other
nations will not be entitled to exercise jurisdiction without some
nexus."185
The basis for jurisdiction under international law in Brehm was
the agreement between the United States and Afghanistan.8 " This
falls into the latter category of bases that are incapable of explaining
due process. The agreement only affects the relationship between
those two countries. It should not affect Brehm's personal rights
under the Due Process Clause. As a result, the principle of
international law should not have been relevant to the court's due
process analysis.
C.

Notice Is the Best Explanationfor the Outcome in Brehm

Buried in the penultimate sentence of the Fourth Circuit's
opinion is the factor that should have been decisive in determining
whether jurisdiction was consistent with the Due Process Clause:
"Brehm's acknowledgement and acceptance of the warnings [in his
employment contract] regarding the criminal jurisdiction asserted by
the United States constituted notice of the same sufficient to dispel
any surprise."' An opinion centered on this fact would have been far
183. Colangelo, supra note 33, at 173. For an explanation of the significance under
international law of the flag flown on the vessel, see supra notes 45-46 and accompanying
text.
184. See Colangelo, supra note 33, at 169 ("[I1f Fifth Amendment due process rights
are truly personal to the accused, how can international law rules prescribing the
jurisdictional reach of governments impair or reduce the fundamental liberty rights of
individuals?").
185. Id. at 173 (alteration in original) (citation omitted). The point here is that the
exercise of jurisdiction is unfair and arbitrary when based on the international law
approach. As will be discussed, jurisdiction was fair on the particular facts of Brehm
because the defendant had actual notice of the likelihood of the United States exercising
jurisdiction. See infra Part IV.C.
186. United States v. Brehm, 691 F.3d 547, 553-54 (4th Cir. 2012) (citing Personnel
Agreement, supra note 74), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 808 (2012).
187. Id. at 554; see also id. at 549 ("The agreement provided, in pertinent part, that
Brehm 'has been informed of, understands and accepts that [he] may be subject to U.S. ...
federal civilian criminal jurisdiction under the [MEJA] by accompanying the U.S. Armed
Forces outside the United States.' " (alterations in the original) (citations omitted)).
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more convincing, coherent, and instructive than the muddled decision
the court provided. Of all of the facts of the case, the existence of
notice appears to be the most compelling reason for finding the
exercise of jurisdiction to be non-arbitrary. Having been made
directly aware of the United States' intent to exercise jurisdiction
over contractors, Brehm should have expected that committing
certain crimes would subject him to jurisdiction not just anywhere,
but in the United States specifically. Even if Brehm did not have
actual notice, he at least had constructive notice.
Brehm's case is therefore different from the cases in which the
nature of the crime demonstrates, through reasoning based on a
nexus or international law, that the defendant had actual or
constructive notice of the application of U.S law."' The notice in
Brehm's case was based on the individual facts of the case. However,
where the facts establish actual or constructive notice, this should be
sufficient to prove that the exercise of jurisdiction is non-arbitrary.
Where the nature of the offense does not automatically demonstrate
that the defendant was on notice, courts should determine notice
through a fact-specific inquiry.

CONCLUSION
Although the Fourth Circuit correctly concluded in Brehm that
jurisdiction over the defendant was consistent with due process, the
court's reasoning was cryptic, and contained several specific
deficiencies. First, its use of the pervasive American influence on the
military basis as a proxy for due process was circular, and lacked any
meaningful explanation of why jurisdiction was fair and non-arbitrary
in the circumstances. Second, the "international law approach," which
the court borrowed from other circuits, is highly flawed, and should
be permanently discarded. Third, the court's finding that the exercise
of jurisdiction contained "no inherent unfairness," though necessary
to establish due process, was not sufficient to do so.
Given the limited facts before it, the Brehm court cannot have
been expected to solve the entire conundrum of the application of the
Due Process Clause in the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction.
Nonetheless, the court could have taken a significant step forward by
basing its decision on the defendant's notice that U.S. law would be
applied to his criminal conduct. Notice, whether actual or
constructive, is the thread that unifies much of the conflicted
188. As discussed, this type of reasoning would not have been dispositive in Brehm. See
supra notes 163, 177 and accompanying text.
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jurisprudence on the subject. The area is too complex to allow for a
single, uniform test for notice in any given case. However, whether
the defendant's notice exists by virtue of the universal nature of the
crime, the projection of harmful effects into the United States, or the
type of actual notice that existed on the facts of Brehm, the concept
ensures that jurisdiction is fair, non-arbitrary, and therefore
consistent with due process. At the same time, this formulation gives
the United States an appropriate level of authority to police
extraterritorial conduct, while also providing defendants, prosecutors,
military authorities, and lower courts with the predictability they all
require.
EDWARD F. ROCHE**

** The author would like to thank his colleagues and friends on the board and staff
of Volume 91 of the North Carolina Law Review, especially Dylan Farmer and Dan
Siegel. The author is also grateful for the helpful feedback that Professors Elizabeth
Gibson and Richard Myers both provided. Last, but not least, the author would like to
thank his wife, Robin, for her patience and support.
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